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The island of Crete was the last Greek region to be subjugated by the 
Ottoman Turks,1 falling after a long and bloody war that lasted from 
1645 to 1669.2 Following the example of mainland Greece, the island 
rose against Ottoman domination in 1821 but, despite some early suc-
cesses, the struggle made little or no progress for three years. No major 
urban centre was captured by the insurgents, who were restricted to the 
possession of two forts of limited importance - those of Kisamos and 
Gramvousa. The presence of a solid Muslim population - almost half 
the population were Tourkokritikoi (i.e. Turco-Cretans), most of whom 
sided with the sultan - was certainly one of the reasons for this situation. 
Another factor in this was the isolation of the island, on account of its dis-
tance from the main theatre of the revolution, to overcome which, 'special 
commissioners', unacquainted with local conditions and characteristics, 
were sent from Greece. Finally, the lack of a fleet of any size accounts for 
the Cretans' failure to counter the steady arrival of Ottoman reinforce-
ments. With the aid of the Egyptians, who landed on Crete in 1822 and 
1823, long before Ibrahim Pasha's intervention in the Péloponnèse, the 
uprising was quickly restricted to the western provinces, where it smoul-
dered until it was finally extinguished. 
The international treaties of 1829, 1830 and 1832 excluded Crete 
from the new Greek kingdom,3 a development that provoked strong, 
though ineffective, protests in both Crete and Greece. The majority of 
the Cretans were obliged to accept this fait accompli, though some, 
mainly those whose activities on the island had exposed them to reprisals 
and a number of families of victims of the struggle, chose to remain in 
Greece, where they had fled after the crushing of the uprising. These and 
their descendants were to form an influential Cretan lobby, which was to 
play an important role in Greek political affairs throughout the nine-
teenth century. 
Meanwhile, the vali of Egypt, Mohamed Ali, judging that the ser-
vices rendered by him in suppressing the Greek uprising had not been 
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appropriately recompensed by the Sublime Porte, decided to claim 
actively what had not been granted him voluntarily. In 1831, Egyptian 
forces successfully invaded Syria and one year later the sultan was com-
pelled to cede the administration of Crete to Mohamed Ali. During the 
period of Egyptian rule (1831-40), the administration of the island was 
assigned to Mustafa Pasha, a man of Albanian descent who had been on 
the island with the Egyptian armies since 1822 and had run the pashalik 
of Chania since 1824.4 
The contradictions between the centripetal desires of the Sublime 
Porte and the centrifugal manoeuvrings of Mohamed Ali were soon 
sharpened once again. Constantinople became increasingly sensitive to 
the danger posed for the future of her empire by the fact that the 
Egyptian, Arabic, Syrian and Cretan provinces were effectively in the 
hands of the ambitious vali of Cairo. For his part, Mohamed Ali wished 
to consolidate his position and achieve recognition of his right to 
bequeath his pashalik to his descendants. A fresh breach was inevitable, 
and in 1839 the Ottoman armies crossed the Euphrates, but were once 
more defeated by the Egyptians. Sultan Mahmud died a week later, while 
the admiral of the Ottoman fleet took his ships to Alexandria and sur-
rendered them to the vali of Egypt. Faced with the vigorous reaction of 
the Great Powers to the possibility of the complete overthrow of the 
status quo in the Near East, and under the threat of the bombardment of 
Alexandria by the European fleets, Mohamed Ali was compelled to back 
down. In accordance with the Treaty of London, signed in 1840 by 
Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, 'acting at the request of the §ultan', 
Mohamed Ali retained Egypt for himself and his descendants, but on 
condition that he returned the other provinces.5 After the restoration in 
Crete of direct rule from Constantinople, the Sublime Porte kept Mustafa 
Pasha in his position, and the change was not greatly felt by the popula-
tion. Mustafa Pasha remained on the island for almost thirty years, until 
September 1851, adding to his name the surname Giritli ('the Cretan').6 
During this period important changes took place in Cretan society, the 
consequences of which were not long in making themselves felt. The end 
of the uprising in the 1820s found Crete full of 'ruins and widows'. 
A good part of the population had either been killed or had abandoned 
the island, and the unremitting struggle had led to the virtually total anni-
hilation of the men-folk in some regions. The average population density 
had fallen to about thirteen inhabitants per square kilometre.7 
In an attempt to bring peace to the island, Mustafa Pasha installed his 
own administrative machinery, refusing to give important offices to local 
Muslims. Observing rudimentary principles of equality, he appointed 
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mixed councils in each Sanjak and introduced the use of the Greek lan-
guage in public documents.8 
The Albanian gendarmerie brought from Egypt attempted to enforce 
law and order, often intervening in support of the Christians and restrain-
ing, not without savagery, the arbitrary actions and resistance of the 
Turco-Cretans: 'Many of the insubordinate Muslims were either beheaded 
or incarcerated at that time in the prison of the Gramvousa fort.'9 
Before this period, tax collection was mainly under the control of local 
agas, who had contracted the right to collect taxes in bulk (mukataa). In 
most cases they secured this right for life (malikiane aghasi) and converted 
it into a hereditary activity, in this way expropriating a large part of the 
agricultural output. The authoritarian structure of this machinery was 
completed both at the economic level, through the process of lending and 
bankruptcy, and at the political level, to the extent that the owner of the 
mukataa usually belonged to the dominant Muslim majority and was sup-
ported by its administrative structures. Applying the policy successfully 
implemented in Egypt by Mohamed Ali twenty years earlier,10 Mustafa 
Pasha removed a large part of the mukataas from the agas, thereby 
depriving them of an important source of economic and social power.11 
The reorganisation of the Ottoman timar system also caused distur-
bance. In 1828 the Sublime Porte decided that the military service obliga-
tions of the timar-holders should be brought up to date and obliged them 
to enrol in new battalions in the regular army, at the same time discour-
aging the right to use a substitute; this led in practice to the gradual 
removal during the 1830s of timars from those who were not in a posi-
tion, or did not wish, to fulfil their new obligations and conform with the 
new regulations.12 
In conclusion, on the morrow of the rebellion, the Muslim community 
of Crete was not only decimated, but its access to the machinery of power 
was reduced, and at the same time the ruling class was largely deprived 
of its ability to appropriate a significant proportion of the wealth pro-
duced by the conquered society. The disenchantment that arose in these 
circumstances led to the emergence of two phenomena within the Muslim 
community. A number of Muslim Cretans reverted to Christianity, and 
many of the rest gradually abandoned the countryside and withdrew to 
the towns and their environs. 
In speaking of a reversion to Christianity, it should be borne in mind 
that the great mass of Cretan Muslims were descended not from Turkish 
settlers - the conquest of Crete in the late seventeenth century had taken 
place at a period when the initial impulse of Ottoman colonisation had 
run itself out - but from native Christians who had converted to Islam, 
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basically of their own free will, during the first century of the conquest. It 
is indicative that these 'Turco-Cretans', as they came to be called, contin-
ued to speak Greek and drink the wine produced by their vineyards, con-
tenting themselves with learning by rote some of the verses from the Koran 
to meet their new religious needs.13 Occasionally, the conversion to Islam 
was feigned and there are references to families who continued to baptise 
their children for two centuries and to take part in parallel religious cere-
monies ('crypto-Christians'), but these tended to be isolated cases.14 
Cases of Turco-Cretans who reverted to Christianity are occasionally 
found as early as the time of the 1821 uprising. A typical example is that 
of the Kourmoulides who, led by the chief of the clan Husein Pasha, 
abandoned Islam en masse - over sixty men - and played a leading role 
in the rebellion.15 The phenomenon became more common later, during 
the 1850s, especially after the signing of the Hatti Humayun charter, to 
which we shall return below. Examples are known of entire villages being 
baptised en masse in the provinces of Mylopotamos and Pediada.16 
Although we do not have the complete quantitative evidence to cal-
culate the dimensions of the phenomenon, it is indicative that the per-
centage increase of the Christian community between 1834 and 1881 
was more than double that of the Muslim community. Even when 
account is taken of the gradual return of the refugees of 1821, who were 
mainly Christians, an increase of this scale in the Christian community 
can hardly be interpreted as the result only of internal demographic 
growth. The Ottoman administration attempted to cut off this stream by 
passing a number of restrictive measures, though these led to a rebellion 
by the people and were the main reason for the removal of the then gov-
ernor general, Veli Pasha.17 This incident was an important indication of 
the decline of the Ottoman regime in Crete. 
During the course of the nineteenth century, the countryside gradually 
became Christian (in 1881, 82.4 per cent of the rural population was 
Christian) and tightly enclosed the Muslim towns (Muslims made up 
70 per cent of the urban population).18 The steady flight of Muslims from 
the countryside, and especially from regions remote from the castles, was 
the result both of the changed terms of exploitation of the land and of the 
sense of insecurity created within the ranks of the Muslim population. 
This development was accompanied by another significant phenome-
non - the purchase of land by Christians. 'After 1829, a large part of the 
land then under Muslim ownership in the most fertile plains, came into 
the hands of Christians. The complete deprivation of the Turks through 
this peaceful revolution,' wrote Georges Perrot in 1867, 'is a question 
of time. Agas and beys, stripped of their estates . . . for a cheap price, 
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inundate the towns, seeking to survive by renting some of the land that 
the Turkish administration is wasting, though it is unable to satisfy all 
the idlers that implore it.' At this point, the comment of the governor 
general of the island, Ismail Hakim Pasha, is revealing: that while forty 
years earlier, Christian estates had accounted for one fifth of the total, 
they had already (by 1866) reached three fifths, according to his calcul-
ations; he ends his comment with the estimation that if the Christians 
persisted systematically, they would ultimately buy Crete from the Turks, 
without the need for a rebellion.19 
This systematic mass purchase of land by Christians was perhaps the 
most characteristic sign of the social change in the making in nineteenth-
century Crete. 'Cases are rare,' stresses the man in charge of the official 
census of the island in 1881, 'of a Cretan villager who does not possess 
his own house and a larger or smaller, fairly productive, piece of agri-
cultural land.'20 
This growth of small- and medium-scale property ownership, which 
was interlinked with the fact that large landed estates based on çiflik-type 
relations were not created on the island (with the exception of a few 
examples of Church properties) meant that the situation in Crete was 
very similar to the one that pertained in what was then free Greece. It is 
revealing that, when it was annexed to Greece in 1912, the island did not 
bring in its baggage problems of land distribution like those posed in the 
cases of Thessaly or Epirus. 
At the same time, the contracting of taxes, now removed from the hands 
of the owners of the mukataa, passed largely under the control of 
Christians, especially the recognized kapetanei (i.e. chieftains) of the 
provinces, who mainly undertook to collect the tithe and the poll tax (the 
military tax after 1856).21 
It may be noted, in conclusion, that in 1881 the majority (60.4 per 
cent) of the Muslims on the island lived in eastern Crete: in Lasithi and 
above all in Irakleion and the two provinces of Rethymnon that bordered 
with Irakleion, Mylopotamos and Amari. Twenty per cent of the 
Muslims lived in the countryside of western Crete, in the administrative 
regions of Rethymnon and Chania, where they formed only 15.4 per cent 
of the rural population.22 
All these developments gave Crete a distinctive character within the 
Ottoman Empire, defined by the following characteristics: in a region 
that was geographically demarcated by its character (an island), a popul-
ation was formed that was for the most part homogeneous with respect 
to its language (Greek), religion (Orthodox Christian) and its clear 
consciousness of belonging to a particular national group that already 
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existed as an independent state a few dozen miles away. The censuses of 
the period before 1881, though rarely agreeing with each other on the 
precise numbers, nevertheless concur in attesting to a clear and steadily 
increasing Christian majority that fluctuated between 62.5 per cent and 
77.4 per cent, depending on the decade and the source of information. It 
was a population firmly rooted in their land which had, moreover, offi-
cially acquired the right to possess arms.23 
These facts help us to understand the phenomenon of the successive 
rebellions of varying range and intensity that broke out throughout the 
whole of the nineteenth century (1821, 1833, 1841, 1858, 1866, 1878, 
1889, 1895, 1897), mainly in western Crete - on occasion with the 
backing of the Greek government but frequently, as we shall see below, 
even against the wishes of the official Greek state. This phenomenon is 
not encountered in other Ottoman provinces, where the subject popula-
tions were not solid and were not marked by homogeneity of religion, 
language or collective consciousness, and where the political, social and 
economic conditions had developed in different directions. 
This population was faced with the Muslim community and the 
Ottoman authority. The former, once very strong numerically, politically 
and economically, fought a rearguard battle throughout the century, until 
it was reduced towards its end to the role of a disenchanted minority of 
11 per cent, confined to the towns and their immediate environs and cut 
off from the hinterland and productive activity. The Ottoman authority, 
on the other hand, was in a state of continual crisis after the middle of 
the century, incapable of establishing and following a consistent policy, 
sometimes dangerously compliant and sometimes inappropriately auto-
cratic, as moderation and arrogance succeeded each other with the same 
frequency that the rulers of the day were sent out - thirty-seven govern-
ors succeeded each other in the space of forty-six years, with an average 
term of office of fifteen months. 
THE UPRISINGS OF 1833 AND 1841 
The first Cretan rebellion after the Greek War of Independence of 1821 
took place as early as 1833, when thousands of Christians assembled, 
unarmed, in the village of Mournies near Chania to protest against the 
taxation measures and other arbitrary actions of Mustafa Pasha. Despite 
the peaceful character of the demonstration, the authorities reacted 
violently, and forty-one of the leaders of the movement and several other 
Christians throughout the island were arrested and hanged, as an example 
to the rest.24 
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The next rebellion took place in 1839 to 1841. The crisis between the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt led, as already mentioned, to the end of 
Egyptian occupation and the restoration of direct Ottoman rule on the 
island, and several Cretans, mainly those who had settled in Greece, con­
sidered that the time was ripe to raise the Cretan question once more. 
Through a series of memoranda addressed to the Great Powers, the 
Cretan Committee sought the unification of the island with Greece or, 
failing that, the granting of internal autonomy. Placing their hopes in the 
intervention of the Powers, or at least of Great Britain, which was 
rumoured to be interested in taking the island under its 'protection', the 
Cretans arose in a rebellion that began in February 1841 and lasted 
about five months. During this period, a number of bloody clashes took 
place, initially in Western Crete and then in the rest of the island, though 
without a substantial outcome.25 This was followed by a fairly long 
period of peace, which, remarkably, was not disturbed even during the 
great crisis of the Eastern Question that broke out in the 1850s and cul­
minated in the Crimean War (1854-6). 
THE ΗΑΤΠ HUMAYUN AND THE FIRMAN OF 1858 
On the basis of article 7 of the Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 March 1856 
after the Crimean War, France, Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Kingdom 
of Piedmont-Sardinia undertook jointly to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the spirit of this principle, any con­
flict in the East would be a matter of European interest. The same treaty 
also envisaged the improvement of the living standards of the Christian 
subjects of the porte. After persistent démarches by the Allies, the sultan 
had already issued an imperial decree (Hatti §erif), the text of which had, 
in effect, been dictated by Allied ambassadors in Constantinople. In an 
attempt to give this document the force of an obligation undertaken to 
the Great Powers, the countries that had signed the Treaty of Paris made 
explicit reference to it in article 9 of that treaty. 'The firman,' it com-
ments, 'was communicated to the Powers, who noted the great import-
ance of this act of communication.'26 
The Hatti §erif of 1856, more widely known as the Hatti Humayun, 
ratified and consolidated the reforms for which it had assumed an oblig-
ation with the Gul Hane charter of 1839. It provided guarantees for the 
safety of the persons and property of all the subjects of the empire 
'without distinction of class or religion', and confirmed all the privileges 
that had been granted 'from very ancient times' to all the non-Muslim 
communities settled in the empire. Any distinction that was intended 
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to make any population group inferior to another on grounds of religion, 
language or race 'was struck from the administrative record', and all 
subjects were to be accepted without discrimination into the public 
services and the political and military schools. All commercial, political 
and legal differences between Muslims and non-Muslims were to be 
referred to joint courts, and freedom of representation on provincial and 
community councils was to be secured for the various religious commu-
nities, as, too, was the principle of equal taxation for all. Other provi-
sions promised the construction of roads, the promotion of public works, 
the reform of the monetary and finance system, and the founding of 
banks.27 
In 1858, many thousands of Cretans assembled in Pervolia near 
Chania and threatened to take to arms if the administration did not pass 
the appropriate measures to carry out the programme of promised 
reforms. The Sublime Porte, which was then experiencing difficulties in 
Montenegro, capitulated to these demands and issued a firman which 
reduced taxes and guaranteed free elections to the councils of elders. The 
implementation of this firman, however, was blocked by the incompe-
tence of the administrative machinery and the hostility of the Muslim 
population to any reform. The appointment of Ismail Pasha as governor 
general of the island in 1861 did not improve the situation. A former 
minister of trade in Constantinople, and of Greek extraction, Ismail 
attempted to please everyone, 'promising everything to everyone, 
without ever keeping his promises'. In this way, he increased the numbers 
of the disaffected. Relations between Christians and Muslims became 
increasingly tense. At the end of 1866, the disaffection assumed fearful 
dimensions and conflict seemed inevitable. 
THE UPRISING OF 1866 
In May 1866, several leading figures in the Christian population of the 
island gathered at Aghia Kyriaki near Chania and sent a long report to 
Ismail Pasha, asking him to convey it to the sultan. In it, ten requests were 
'respectfully' submitted, including relief from the inflated taxation, 
improvement of public transport, free elections to the councils of elders, 
the creation of a loan bank, improvement of the juridical system and the 
reintroduction of the Greek language in legal transactions, the securing 
of guarantees of personal liberty, the creation of schools and hospitals, 
permission to trade freely from all the ports on the island and, finally, a 
general amnesty for those who had participated 'in the general uprising 
in our Homeland'.28 
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At the same time as submitting this report to the sultan, those assem-
bled in Aghia Kyriaki also put their signatures to a confidential memo-
randum intended for the three Powers protecting Greece, in which, after 
referring to their part in the Greek War of Independence of 1821 and, 
despite this, 'their subjugation once more to the Ottoman yoke', they 
called upon the Powers to consent to their unification 'with their Greek 
brothers' or, 'if this is not possible at the present time', at least to the 
granting of a form of political organisation that would ensure 'Christian 
and humane' governance.29 After these documents were signed, the 
assembly was dissolved, leaving a committee to await the official reply. 
Before carrying out their plans, the Cretans had been in contact with 
the Russian and Greek consuls in Chania. The former, though declaring 
himself Opposed to revolutionary movements', nevertheless counselled 
them to pursue certain reforms by peaceful means, including the aboli-
tion of the new taxes, free elections to the councils of elders, and so on, 
promising his 'probable support'. The Greek consul 'avoided giving them 
encouragement', since the government in Athens strongly disapproved of 
a Cretan uprising at that point in time, observing that the current polit-
ical situation in Europe was 'not favourable to a serious enterprise of this 
nature', and advising the Cretans to content themselves with seeking 
'with moderation, relief from some of the unbearable taxes, and nothing 
more'.30 
The situation was already deteriorating, however. The Muslims and 
their families sought refuge in the fortified towns, while the Christians 
armed themselves and gathered in the mountains and Ismail Pasha called 
upon the committee to disband, stating that he regarded its continued 
existence as a revolutionary act. The Sublime Porte's answer, publicly 
posted on 20 July, rejected the demands with menaces. 'More than all the 
subjects of the empire,' it noted, 'the Cretans enjoy benefits,' and 'they 
have no right or reason to request the abolition of taxes,' while 'with 
regard to roads, schools, hospitals, etc.,' improvements 'cannot be imple-
mented forthwith, but very gradually'. On the other hand, by advancing 
these demands, the Cretans 'have risen in revolt, arranged gatherings, 
and behaved in a way that could not but be described as rebellion'. The 
governor general of the island was ordered to send forces to arrest the 
leaders of the 'rebellion', and disperse the rest 'by force', unless they 'sub-
mitted and provided written guarantees of their submission in the 
future'.31 
After this, the insurgents, who had already formed themselves into a 
'General Assembly of Cretans', gathered at Askyphou near Sphakia 
where, on 21 August 1866, they voted in favour of the dissolution of 
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Turkish authority and 'the unbroken and eternal unification of Crete and 
all her dependencies with Mother Greece'. The implementation of the 
vote was assigned 'to the bravery of the courageous people of Crete, to 
the assistance of Greeks throughout the world and all philhellenes, to the 
Mighty intervention of the Protecting and Guarantor Great Powers, and 
to the omnipotence of God on High'.32 
The insurrection was proclaimed on paper through this vote, and in 
practice through armed struggle. Five days later, the insurgents laid siege 
to the Ottoman forces in Vryses near Apokoronas, obliging them to with-
draw. In every area of the island the rebels came face to face with the 
regular army and Turkish Cretan irregulars, who shut themselves up in 
the forts and made frequent sallies to strike at the surrounding villages. 
There followed the longest and most bloody of all the Cretan uprisings 
of the nineteenth century. It lasted about three years, during which 
Egyptian forces landed once again on the island to reinforce the Turkish 
efforts, while on the other side, a large number of volunteers from Greece 
and also from Europe and America hastened to fight on the side of the 
rebels.33 During the same period, five successive Ottoman governors 
were replaced, in an endeavour to quell the insurrection, and six Greek 
governments followed one upon the other as a result of the reverberations 
of their policies on the Cretan question. The kingdom of Greece and the 
Ottoman Empire broke off diplomatic relations and came to the verge of 
open military conflict, which was averted at the last moment through the 
intervention of an international conference convened in Paris to deter-
mine the terms on which the crisis could be resolved. During the course 
of the rebellion thousands were killed on both sides, hundreds of villages 
were torched and looted, and the productive base of the island suffered a 
severe blow, while 50,000 women and children fled to Greece as refugees. 
Amongst them were the seven members of the family of the Cretan mer-
chant Kyriakos Venizelos, who fled from Chania to Kythira and thence to 
Syros, taking with them their last-born child, Eleftherios Venizelos, then 
only three years old. 
Despite the subsequent isolation of the maximalist supporters of uni-
fication with Greece and the predominance of the moderate group 
that favoured an autonomous principality of Crete within the Ottoman 
Empire,34 and despite the global sympathy elicited by the struggles and 
sacrifices, the insurrection failed to influence the prevailing attitude of 
international diplomacy, which favoured the maintenance of the status 
quo in the Ottoman Empire.35 After a series of desperate battles, most of 
the revolutionaries retreated before the superiority of the enemy forces 
and, having neither food nor munitions, submitted to the Turks or fled to 
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Greece, though a few isolated groups continued to wander in the gorges, 
becoming involved in minor skirmishes until the spring of 1869.36 
THE ORGANIC STATUTE OF 1868 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
Despite the failure to achieve its immediate aims, the uprising of 1866 to 
1869 nevertheless had a side-effect, the true dimensions and conse-
quences of which were not appreciated at the time. In November 1867, 
in an attempt to undermine the insurrection by removing the basis for its 
claims, the Ottoman government announced, through the mouth of the 
grand vizier Ali Pasha himself, who had gone to Crete for this purpose 
and was personally handling the entire affair, a special administrative 
regulation, which was signed by the sultan in January 1868 and became 
known as the Organic Statute of Crete.37 In addition to the restructuring 
of the administration of the island, this law provided for the involvement 
of Christians at every level of the administrative machinery and in the 
composition of the courts, for the equal use of the Turkish and Greek lan-
guages in the administration, for the creation of a local bank and, 
perhaps most importantly of all, for the election of a general assembly 
with legislative competence at local level. 
These measures might have relieved the atmosphere somewhat, had 
they been passed in good time in response to the original Cretan demands, 
but now, after a year of bloody conflict, they appeared to come too late 
and were predictably rejected outright by the rebels, who had by this time 
entered on a struggle with broader aims. 
Once the insurrection was* suppressed, however, the implementation 
of the Organic Statute ushered in a new period in nineteenth-century 
Cretan history, though in the end this was not in the direction hoped for 
by its inspirers. 
Probably the most important feature of all was the role played by 
the institution of the General Assembly. With a mixed membership 
drawn from both ethnic groups on the island, and elected indirectly by 
the local elders, this assembly was to meet forty days each year in closed 
sessions, to pass measures relating to local issues such as transport, 
public works, the credit system, trade, farming, education, and so on, 
though its decisions had to be ratified by the governor general and the 
Ottoman government. 
In the early years, this assembly functioned in only a rudimentary 
manner: the administration interfered in the election process, which was 
in any case indirect, the representation of the ethnic groups was unbal-
anced (the Christians, who formed 74 per cent of the population, had a 
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majority of two and later only one seat), the debates were conducted in 
an authoritarian manner by the governor general, who was ex officio 
chairman, the assembly was frequently dissolved before the forty days 
had elapsed and very few of its substantive decisions were in fact ratified. 
Even in these adverse circumstances, however, its operation created a 
forum for debate about the basic problems of the people of Crete and 
revealed the dynamism of the Christian element, but at the same time 
demonstrated that a basically rational approach to even the simplest of 
local issues, conflicted de facto with the very nature of the Ottoman 
regime. 
THE CHALEPA PACT OF 1878 
The sequence of international events in the Balkans from the middle of 
the 1870s onwards (revolt of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875 to 1876, inter-
vention of Serbia and Montenegro on the side of the rebels in 1876, the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877 to 1878),38 created a highly charged atmos-
phere in Crete. While not leading directly to an uprising aimed at seces-
sion, this encouraged in the ranks of the Christian community on the 
island the growth of a strong reform movement, to which the General 
Assembly gave expression. A factor that is perhaps not unconnected with 
this development is that the original social composition of the body, 
which was overwhelmingly rural in nature, had begun to change after 
1875, when the first new Christian representatives took their seats, most 
of them doctors and lawyers who had trained at the University of 
Athens.39 
Already in the assembly of 1876, the Christians refused to discuss the 
usual current affairs and made an issue not only of the unfettered imple-
mentation of the Organic Statute, but also of its amendment to conform 
with the requirements of the principle of equality. Their long memoran-
dum, submitted on 22 May 1876 and conveyed to Constantinople by the 
governor general, Reuf Pasha, demanded fairer representation of the 
Christian population in the assembly, the administration and the judi-
ciary, the right to draw up a local budget, the prohibition of incarcera-
tion without a previous judicial decision, and the freedom to build 
churches. 
The response of the Sublime Porte, which was publicly posted on 
2 August, rejected the demands submitted, apart from a few, such as the 
founding of a bank, the institution of compulsory public education, the 
law specifying rules for holding municipal elections, and the right to 
establish printing presses and publish newspapers.40 This attitude, while 
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satisfying the Muslims, gave rise to intense anger amongst the Christian 
population. Christian officials, administrative counsellors and judges 
continued to abstain from their duties, since the assembly, which had been 
dissolved prematurely, had not had time to renew their period of office; 
meanwhile, the first armed bands had already made their appearance in 
the mountains, and the Cretan lobby in Athens was collecting money and 
munitions. The Ottoman administration attempted to strangle the move-
ment at birth by arresting, without any specific charge, the lawyer 
Constantinos Mitsotakis, representative of Kydonia and a leading figure 
in the Christian community. However, it was obliged in the end to set him 
free, when the electors refused to vote for a replacement and, for the first 
time in history, a popular demonstration took place in the centre of 
Chania, in front of the governor general's residence.41 These events illus-
trated the profound psychological change in the morale of the Christians 
and the irreversible decline of Ottoman control over the island. 
Meanwhile, in a desperate attempt to forestall the rapid general devel-
opments that threatened the cohesion of the entire edifice of the Ottoman 
Empire, the new sultan, Abdul Hamid II (the third in three months, after 
a series of coups d'état and resignations) announced the granting of a 
constitution and the impending election of an Ottoman parliament for 
the first time.42 
This is not the place to examine this political movement in depth, 
which in any case swiftly proved ephemeral and of no consequence. The 
Cretans, who were called upon to send two members of parliament to 
Constantinople, one Christian and one Muslim, treated the entire matter 
as a threat to their albeit rudimentary autonomy and to any improve-
ments they had managed to bring about in the affairs of their island, and 
as a retrograde step that restored Crete to the status of merely an 
Ottoman province, subjected, with no special provisions, to the general 
institutional framework of the empire. Despite the appeals and the 
asphyxiating pressure applied by the administration, no more than five 
Christian electors could be persuaded to take part in the electoral process 
in March 1877,43 while the two Christian 'members of parliament' who 
were 'elected' one after the other to represent their fellow islanders in the 
Ottoman parliament, refused the office.44 
Meanwhile, the insurrection proceeded, the movements of armed bands 
about the countryside intensified, and the kapetanei who had lived in exile 
in Greece since 1868 continued to return to the island. All this culminated 
in January 1878 in the convening of the 'Pan-Cretan Revolutionary 
Assembly' at the village of Fres in the province of Apokoronas. Having 
become embroiled in the war with Russia, the Sublime Porte was not in a 
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position to mobilise enough forces to suppress the uprising, and was 
obliged to come to terms with the insurgents. In any case, defeat on the 
battlefield soon followed,45 and the Treaty of Berlin in July 1878 ordained 
that 'the Sublime Porte is obliged strictly to implement in the island of 
Crete the Organic Statute of 1868, after such amendments as may be 
judged necessary'.46 
Almost relieved that it did not have to cede Crete, like Thessaly and 
Arta, to Greece, the Ottoman government entered into negotiations, and 
in October 1878 the Pact of Chalepa was signed in the suburb of this name 
in Chania and was ratified by a firman of the sultan on 9 November 1878. 
The Chalepa Pact brought to the Organic Statute some notable changes 
which, as was explicitly stated, 'cannot be modified by the [Ottoman] 
Constitution'. An obligatory term of five years was fixed for the gover-
nors of the island, in order to give continuity to the administration, and 
explicit reference was made, albeit only to the possibility, to his being of 
Christian descent; and, in either case, he was to be assisted by a counsel-
lor of the other religion. A local gendarmerie was created, in which both 
ethnic communities participated. Administrative correspondence and 
judicial decisions were to be composed in both languages, while Greek 
was to be the only official language for sessions of the courts and the 
General Assembly. The latter was to consist of eighty members, with a 
clear Christian majority (forty-nine against thirty-one).47 
THE UNUSUAL 'PARLIAMENTARY' SYSTEM OF CRETE UNDER 
TURKISH RULE (1878-89) 
The Pact of Chalepa was immediately put into practice with the appoint-
ment as governor general of Alexandros Karatheodori Pasha, one of the 
numerous eminent Christians holding high office in the Ottoman admin-
istration. The first violation of the treaty occurred a mere fourteen days 
later, when, instead of serving for a five-year period, Karatheodori was 
suddenly replaced by his colleague Ioannis Photiadis Pasha.48 Photiadis 
was the first, and only, governor who not only remained in his post for 
five years, but whose period of office was renewed, ending ingloriously 
in 1885.49 He was followed by a series of three governors, up to 1889, 
Ioannis Savvas Pasha for twenty months, Kostakis Anthopoulos Pasha 
for fifteen months, and Nikolakis Sardinski Pasha for sixteen months. It 
is notable that the Sublime Porte appeared more prepared to appoint 
governors of Christian origin (which was only envisaged as a possibility 
in the Chalepa Pact) than to keep them in post for five years (which was 
an express obligation). 
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This decade is marked by the longest attempt to apply in Crete a 
regime that had some, albeit rudimentary, liberal and parliamentary 
features. Its implementation threw into relief the contradictions and 
limitations of the regime. 
At that period, the division of Cretan society into two political 
groups - that of the liberals or 'barefooted' (xypolitoi) and that of the 
conservatives or karavanades - had become consolidated. The division, 
whose roots lay in the distant past, had been established as early as the 
time of the Organic Statute, which created a complicated administra-
tive machine and an attendant plethora of administrative posts. To 
capture these a solid political faction was formed, which was on good 
terms with the administration. This faction included a wide variety of 
individuals, ranging from those who had taken part in the 1866 events 
as spies, informers and collaborators of the Turks to the naturally con-
servative property owners (who were opposed to subversive move-
ments and the attendant dangers), a large part of the senior clergy, and 
ordinary opportunists who had an eye on financial or other gains.50 
This faction often formed a de facto alliance with the corresponding 
Muslim party of the beys, in which eminent, wealthy Muslim notables 
were to be found alongside senior administrative officials and army offi-
cers, members of the fanatical religious brotherhoods, the sub-prole-
tariat of Muslim settlers,51 and ordinary fortune-seekers. The major 
characteristic shared by these was their steadfast opposition to even the 
simple reform measures put forward by the Sublime Porte, and their 
systematic undermining of the governors who attempted to implement 
them.52 
'The only positive distinction that one could confirm between the two 
fighting factions,' notes the young, rising politician, Eleftherios Venizelos, 
with studied moderation, in one of his first political writings: 
was that the one - which consisted from the very beginning of the most vital ele-
ments of the land and included almost all the scholars of the day, invariably took 
the initiative, proved itself more vigorous than the other, played a leading role 
and invariably fought for various reforms - was more exposed to the wrath of 
the government and was therefore persecuted and crushed by it, despite often 
being in a majority, while the other - which contained more conservative 
elements and consisted mainly of those who had been politically active in the 
past - was rather reserved in the present and served as the moderating tool of 
the impulsive power of the first faction. 
In this state of affairs, it is very natural that the vigorous faction claimed for 
itself the title of progressive or Liberal Party and attributed the title conservative 
to the other, which the latter was quite happy to accept without protest .53 
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In practice, things were not quite so simple, however, and the rivalry 
between the two factions had reached the point where it could spark 
fierce passions, igniting spirits to a level that posed a danger to the cohe-
sion of the island's population. The electoral system was a factor con-
tributing to this atmosphere: half the representatives were replaced every 
year, being chosen by the electors, who were themselves selected through 
an indirect method. Moreover, the assembly also served as an electoral 
court, a circumstance that enabled the (usually conservative) majority of 
the day arbitrarily to form the political landscape, taking up almost half 
the parliamentary session of forty days in a usually successful endeavour 
to invalidate the election of their liberal rivals.54 At the same time, the 
Pact of Chalepa introduced the condition that the majority of public 
offices should be filled by elections instead of through arbitrary appoint-
ment by the Ottoman authorities (the method used hitherto), thus going 
from one extreme to the other and turning the island into an unending 
electoral battlefield.55 
At the end of the 1880s the two parties prepared for a final con-
frontation. In the spring of 1888, the liberal faction won the elections for 
the first time. There followed a spate of objections by their rivals, but 
ultimately the General Assembly proceeded with its task and, in the very 
short period left between the review of the elections and the end of the 
session, managed to vote in some important laws relating to the organ-
isation of the municipalities, the organisation of the gendarmerie, the 
founding of a bank, and so on. One of the new measures involved a 
revised electoral law that introduced into Crete for the first time the prin-
ciple of universal (male, of course) secret suffrage.56 
The following elections, held on 2 April 1889 under this new system, 
led to a crushing defeat for the conservatives, who managed to return only 
eleven representatives, and the triumph of the liberal faction, with forty 
representatives elected. One of these was Eleftherios Venizelos, who had 
recently (1887) graduated from the law school of Athens University,57 and 
was returned for the first time as representative of Kydonia, in place of his 
retiring brother-in-law Constantinos Mitsotakis,58 who also made over 
to him the newspaper Lefka Ori (White Mountains), which he had pub-
lished since 1880. The newspaper was republished in 1888 by Venizelos, 
C. Fournis, Ch. Poloyiorgis and I. Moatsos, who formed a modernising 
group within the Liberal Party that became known as the Lefkoreites, after 
the name of their newspaper. 
The side of each of the two conflicting parties of the Christian com-
munity was taken by the corresponding factions of the Muslim repre-
sentatives. As was to be expected, the first sessions of the new General 
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Assembly were inundated with objections to the elections, further ignit-
ing the already strong party passions. 
THE 'REVOLUTION' OF 1889 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
While the review of the elections was still in progress, however, five of 
the representatives of the conservative faction suddenly submitted a 
memorandum in which they declared it to be their judgement that no 
improvement could be made in the affairs of the island under the present 
regime and that they considered the only solution to be the unification of 
Crete with Greece; accordingly, they decided to abstain from the work of 
the assembly, and were followed in this by the other minority members.59 
This unexpected action took place despite the efforts of the Greek 
consul in Chania to avert it. The consul's attitude was giving explicit 
expression to the total opposition of the Greek government under 
Charilaos Trikoupis to any movement in Crete. The majority were now 
faced with a terrible dilemma, for if they failed to declare themselves in 
favour of this untimely conservative initiative, they risked being accused 
of betraying the national cause. 
On 5 June 1889, the General Assembly submitted to the extraordinary 
imperial emissary Mahmud Pasha a series of economic demands, amongst 
them the incorporation of customs revenues into the local budget, and the 
founding of an agricultural bank with the right to issue banknotes. The 
assembled opposition supporters abandoned completely their demand for 
unification with Greece and submitted a memorandum in which they 
sought the replacement of the governor general Sardinski Pasha (the only 
governor who had not taken the side of the conservative faction but had 
collaborated with the liberal majority), the invalidation of all the acts of 
the General Assembly and the dismissal of all civil servants, adding, in a 
purely demagogic spirit, the cancellation of debts to the state and fairer 
administration of justice, amongst other things. The Party of the Beys 
made similar demands in a corresponding memorandum.60 
The response of the imperial emissary was publicly posted on 22 June. 
While offering a temporary solution to the financial problems and 
promising the future creation of a bank, it rejected the other demands, 
since they had not been submitted through the official assembly but had 
been formulated by a gathering that did not legally represent the province. 
This development initially discouraged the assembled representatives, but 
it was then decided to force the issue by moving to Boutsounaria, the 
usual venue for revolutionary gatherings near Chania, it being known 
that, as Venizelos observed, 'The mere name of this place caused Christian 
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breasts to beat with a sacred pulse, and sent a corresponding chill down 
Turkish spines.'61 Rejecting any discussions with their party rivals and all 
the admonitions of the Greek government, the supporters of the insur-
rection sought to create a fait accompli by terrorising the Muslims of the 
countryside, in the hope that this would strengthen their final negotiating 
position. 
At the same time, while the imperial emissary was recalled to Constan-
tinople, signs of a hardening of respective attitudes became apparent, with 
the first armed clashes between Christians and Muslims, and also between 
Christians of rival factions, while the usual attacks by aggressive Muslim 
crowds on the Christian inhabitants of the towns also began. Faced with 
a deteriorating situation, the leaders of the two Christian factions con-
cluded an agreement in principle with the liberals agreeing to consent to 
the demand for the replacement of Sardinski Pasha, on condition that 
the armed gatherings of conservatives should be dissolved forthwith. 
Although the Ottoman government agreed to the now joint demand and 
hastened to dismiss the governor general on 16 July 1889, the conserva-
tive grouping failed to observe the agreement. The dynamic of the situ-
ation had made them captives of their own armed bands, who refused to 
disband and rejected any compromise. This gave the local Turkish gover-
nors a pretext for arming the paramilitary Muslim bands which were 
intensifying their activities against the Christians, whose families rushed 
once more to the shores of the island in order to flee to Greece by what-
ever means possible. Already 'armed bands of both religious groups were 
polluting the country, raping, burning and murdering'.62 
In this climate, the Greek government issued a communiqué to the 
Great Powers declaring its intention to intervene to protect the Christian 
population, while Constantinople appointed Shakir Pasha as military 
governor and locum tenens of the governor general, with instructions to 
restore order swiftly. When he arrived in Crete, Shakir Pasha at once pro-
claimed martial law and succeeded in a short time in restricting the activ-
ities of the intransigent Muslims and driving the armed Christians into 
the mountains. The majority of the leading politicians, irrespective of 
party, fled to Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos amongst them. 
The most important consequence of the 'revolution of 1889', however, 
was that it provided the Ottoman government with a pretext for arbi-
trarily revoking most of the reforms that had been achieved by the 
Pact of Chalepa, eleven years earlier. A firman issued by the sultan on 
17 November 1889 abolished a series of regulations, such as the obliga-
tory five-year term of the governor general, the limited term of presiding 
judges and public prosecutors (who were now to be appointed for life by 
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the government), and the practice of giving preference to locals in 
appointments to the gendarmerie. At the same time it was ordained that 
in the appointment of civil servants, preference would be given hence-
forth to those who spoke Turkish, and the number of members of the 
General Assembly was reduced from eighty to fifty-seven (thirty-five 
Christians and twenty-two Muslims), who were not to be elected by uni-
versal male suffrage but indirectly by electors from each province. An 
amnesty was proclaimed in theory, though exceptions were made in the 
case of leaders of the insurgents who had already been condemned by 
courts martial and politicians who were considered to have played a 
leading role in the recent 'troubles'. Amongst the latter was included 
Eleftherios Venizelos who, despite his clear opposition to the recent 
events, was thus recognised by his rivals in the most official manner as 
the undisputed leader of the Cretan people.63 
THE UPRISING OF 1895 
Martial law was lifted and persecutions ceased in 1890. The broader 
consequences of the events of 1889 were still felt, however, as arbitrary 
actions by the Ottoman authorities continued and all traces of self-
administration were, in essence, effaced: the majority of Christians 
refused to accept appointment to public office or to participate in the 
elections that would have given a veneer of legality to the new regime. 
Sardinski was succeeded by five Muslim pashas, none of whose terms of 
office exceeded fourteen months. 
In March 1895, Alexandros Karatheodori Pasha was put in place as 
governor general for the second time in his career. Although the expe-
rienced former minister of foreign affairs managed to persuade the 
Christians to end their abstention from public life and to send represen-
tatives to the General Assembly, his policy soon led to an impasse. The 
intransigent Muslims turned to acts of violence, designed to create an 
unsettled situation that would lead to the recall of Karatheodori to 
Constantinople, Christian bands proceeded to exact reprisals and also 
the question was raised of restoring the special regulations of the Pact of 
Chalepa. 
The pasha dissolved the General Assembly, while Manousos 
Koundouros, a judge from Sphakia, took the initiative in forming a com-
mittee known as the Metapoliteftiki (change-of-government) and pro-
ceeded to draw up a memorandum, which was approved by the General 
Assembly that met at Krapi in Apokoronas in September 1895. This 
memorandum sought the granting of partial autonomy to Crete under a 
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Christian governor, who would hold office for five years, and the restora-
tion of the Chalepa privileges in an improved and expanded form. This 
was the first time that an insurrection had not begun with the standard 
demand for union with Greece, but from the start set itself 'reformist' 
objectives. Its activities were nevertheless regarded as revolutionary and 
Karatheodori, having attempted in vain to arrest its leaders, was recalled 
in February 1896. The general amnesty proffered by his successor, 
Turhan Pasha, also appointed governor of the island for the second time, 
met with no response and hostilities intensified, culminating in the siege 
of Vamos Apokoronou by the insurgents in May 1896. 
After these developments, the Ottoman government sent out the 
former ruler of Samos, Georgios Verovic Pasha, as new governor, and on 
31 July, under pressure from the Great Powers, was obliged to cede a new 
Organic Statute. This provided for the appointment of a Christian as 
governor general for a period of five years, with the approval of the 
Powers, for the creation of a Cretan gendarmerie organised and staffed 
at officer level by Europeans, for the filling of public offices by local 
Christians and Muslims in the proportions of two to one, and for guar-
antees of judicial and economic independence.64 
TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS CRETAN STATE 
The acceptance of the new charter by the rebels calmed passions for a 
time, but a fresh impasse soon emerged, when the intransigent Muslims 
of the island, in collaboration with hard-core circles of the Ottoman gov-
ernment, put into practice a fresh plan to undermine the new regime by 
creating a climate of terror. This rapidly escalated from the isolated 
murders of leading Christians to the mass slaughter of the Christian popu-
lations of the towns and the torching of Christian neighbourhoods.65 
The Christians also formed armed bands, escalating their activities in 
their turn, and the Great Powers sought for ways out of the crisis, finally 
deciding on international intervention. Meanwhile, the Greek government 
of Theodoros Diliyannis decided to forestall them by sending an expedi-
tionary force to capture the island (1 February 1897). This decision, taken 
under the pressure of the intransigents (intransigent political elements and 
extreme nationalist groups) and public opinion, with no military prepar-
ation or diplomatic groundwork, was to lead to the so-called 'unfortun-
ate' Greek-Turkish War of 1897, which ended disastrously for Greece. At 
the same time, however, it accelerated the development of events in Crete 
by forcing the decision on an international occupation of the island, 
leading thereafter to its proclamation as an autonomous principality. This 
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brought to an end over three centuries of occupation by the Ottoman 
Empire, the last soldier of which departed the island on 12 November 
1898.6 6 
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